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The Stock Market Valuation of R&D Leaders 
Abstract 
 
We examine future excess returns, earnings variability and stock volatility of R&D 
Leaders and Followers. Drawing on the business strategy literature, which makes a clear 
distinction between R&D Leaders and Followers, we show that R&D Leaders do earn 
significant future excess returns, while R&D Followers just earn average returns. We 
further document that R&D Leaders generate higher future sales growth, and return-on-
assets than Followers. We also tackle the perennial question of whether the excess returns 
subsequent to R&D are due to mispricing or risk, and show that only a small part of the 
returns can be attributed to risk compensation.  Finally, it has been documented that R&D 
expenditures are strongly associated with future earnings volatility, suggesting that R&D 
is less reliable (verifiable) an asset than physical capital.  We show that the association 
between R&D intensity and future earnings volatility of R&D Leaders is not lower than 
that of R&D Followers. Thus, penetrating the population of R&D firms to distinguish 
between R&D Leaders and Followers, we bridge the chasm between the major findings 
of the economics/finance strand and the accounting body of R&D research.  
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I. Introduction 
Research and development (R&D) expenditures and their consequences have 
been extensively investigated in the economics, finance, and accounting literatures.  
There appears, however, to be a wide chasm between the major findings of the 
economics/finance strand and the accounting body of R&D research:  Whereas most 
economics/finance studies conclude that the returns on R&D are “average,” namely do 
not exceed the normal returns of non-R&D firms, accounting studies consistently indicate 
that R&D intensity is positively associated with both contemporaneous and future excess 
stock returns. 
Drawing on the business strategy literature, which makes a clear distinction 
between R&D “leaders” and “followers,” we show that leaders do earn future significant 
excess returns, while R&D followers just earn average returns.  We further document that 
R&D leaders generate higher future sales growth, and return-on-assets than followers.  
We also tackle the perennial question of whether the excess returns subsequent to R&D 
are due to mispricing or risk, and show that only a small part of the returns can be 
attributed to risk compensation.  Finally, it has been documented that R&D expenditures 
are strongly associated with future earnings volatility, suggesting that R&D is less 
reliable (verifiable) an asset than physical capital.  We show that this is driven mainly by 
R&D followers. The association between R&D intensity and future earnings volatility of 
leaders is lower than that of followers. Collectively, the findings suggest that R&D 
leaders’ are mispriced by investors due to lack of information. Thus, penetrating the 
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population of R&D firms to distinguish between R&D leaders and followers, we bring 
closure to several key empirical issues which were unresolved so far. 
The evidence with respect to R&D activity and future performance especially in 
terms of subsequent stock returns is mixed. Chan et al. (2001) show that firms engaging 
in R&D earn similar stock returns to firms that do not engage in R&D; and, R&D 
intensive firms as measured by R&D to sales ratio do not earn future excess stock returns. 
Hall et al. (1993) shows that the stock market overvalues R&D; and Hall et al. (2005) 
shows that the valuation multiplier on R&D is lower in recent years. A recent study by 
Booz Allen Hamilton finds that the performance of large R&D firms is similar to that of 
small R&D firms (see Jaruzelski et al., 2005). On the other hand, a number of studies 
have shown the association of R&D activity with contemporaneous market value and 
future excess stock returns (for example, see Lev and Sougiannis, 1996, Lev et al., 2005). 
Chan et al. (2001) show a positive association between R&D intensity as measured by 
R&D to market value and abnormal future returns.1 This association of R&D activity and 
future excess stock returns could be due to delayed reaction by the stock market or 
inadequate adjustment for risk (see, Lev and Sougiannis, 1996 and Chambers et al., 
2002). 
 We examine the relationship between future performance and R&D by 
recognizing that not all R&D activities are similar. Firms strategically choose to be R&D 
Leaders or Followers (see Porter, 1979, 1980, 1985): some R&D firms are Leaders who 
introduce new and innovative products while others are Followers who mimic or react to 
                                                 
1 Other studies show the positive association between future stock returns and changes in R&D investments 
(see Penman and Zhang, 2002; Eberhart, Maxwell and Siddique, 2004). 
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the products of the Leaders. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, firms such as 
Merck, Eli Lilly and Pfizer are R&D Leaders while generic drug makers such as 
Chattem, Mylan, Natures Sunshine, Igi and Icn are Followers. Research in strategy and 
economics suggests that R&D Leaders have sustained future profitability as well as lower 
business dissolution risk. Thus, in a strategic sense the nature and focus of R&D efforts 
could be different across firms. 
Firms with R&D intensity measure greater than (lesser than or equal to) that of 
the industry are classified as Leaders (Followers). R&D intensity is measured using two 
proxies: the R&D expenditure to sales ratio and the R&D expenditure to market value 
ratio.2 Examining some characteristics of R&D Leaders and Followers we find the 
following: Leaders have lower book-to-market ratio, higher market value of equity, 
higher sales growth, lower earnings-to-price ratio, lower return-on-equity and lower 
dividend yield than Followers. These characteristics suggest that book value of equity 
and earnings are biased downwards for R&D Leaders due to conservative accounting (see 
Lev et al., 2005). Leaders’ future market share, future sales growth and future return on 
assets are higher than that of Followers. These characteristics suggest that Leaders have 
sustained future profitability.  
We then examine the stock market valuation of R&D activity. Recognizing the 
strategic differences in R&D activity enables us to interpret the future excess returns in 
terms of delayed reaction by investors and inadequate adjustment for risk. First, if R&D 
                                                 
2 We also use the R&D intensity measures using R&D capital instead of R&D expenditures and consider an 
R&D Leader to be following an innovation strategy when the firm is considered a Leader in two and three 
consecutive years. The results are qualitatively similar and much stronger than the results reported in the 
paper. 
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is equally risky for Leaders and Followers, then we expect the future excess returns to be 
similar for both. Second, if R&D is considered more risky for Leaders than Followers, 
then we expect the difference in future excess returns to be constant. We find that the 
difference in future annual excess returns between Leaders and Followers are 0.99%, 
7.58%, 3.93% and 2.44% in the first, second, third and fourth years, respectively. This 
suggests that even though some of the excess returns (about 2.50% excess returns in the 
fourth year) may be due to incomplete risk adjustment, the majority of the second and 
third year excess returns are due to delayed reaction by investors. These differences in 
future annual excess returns are exacerbated when a firm is a Leader/Follower for two 
consecutive years: an alternative measure of innovation strategy. We find that the future 
excess returns of R&D Followers is zero on average, thus suggesting that innovation 
activity by itself is not a contributor to future excess returns: the nature of R&D in terms 
of innovation strategy drives the delayed market reaction. This positive association of 
R&D Leaders and future excess stock returns is attributable to delayed market reaction 
for one important reason: the future excess returns is positive and high in the second and 
third years and decreases substantially in the fourth year (a reversal). 
To examine whether the positive future excess returns of R&D Leaders’ are due 
to innovation strategy being more risky, we examine two measures of risk across Leaders 
and Followers: stock returns volatility and future earnings variability. The strategy and 
economics literature argues that R&D Leaders should have lower business risk (see 
Caves and Porter, 1977; Caves and Ghemawat, 1992). Kothari et al. (2002) find that 
R&D expenditures are more strongly associated with future earnings variability than 
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capital expenditures, suggesting that R&D expenditures are more risky. These 
arguments/findings emphasize again the chasm between the two streams of literature: 
finance/economics and accounting. Stock returns volatility and earnings variability are 
measures of perceived risk (See Bushee and Noe, 2000; Beaver et al. 1970). We regress 
stock returns volatility on R&D expenditures and an interaction between Leaders and 
R&D expenditures controlling for other factors (see Bushee and Noe, 2000). We find that 
while stock returns volatility is positively associated with R&D expenditures, stock 
returns volatility of Leaders is significantly smaller than that of Followers. This is 
consistent with the argument that the perceived risk of Leaders is lower than that of 
Followers. We regress future earnings variability on R&D expenditure and an interaction 
between Leaders and R&D expenditure controlling for other factors (see Kothari et al., 
2002). We find that the association of R&D expenditure with future earnings variability 
of Leaders is lower than that of Followers. This suggests that R&D expenditures of 
Leaders do not induce higher earnings variability. Thus, we conclude that the incomplete 
risk control argument for the future excess returns of Leaders is not a plausible reason for 
such a phenomenon. 
To summarize, we find that R&D Leaders exhibit higher future profitability and 
lower risk than Followers, but the investors reaction appears to be delayed. This delay 
could occur due to behavioral aspects or lack of information. We shed some light on the 
possibility of investors’ delayed reaction due to lack of information. For this purpose, we 
examine whether financial analysts’ (an important information intermediary) incorporate 
the potential higher future profitability of Leaders in their long-term earnings growth 
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forecasts. We find that the long-term growth forecasts are on average 5% higher for 
Leaders than Followers. This shows that financial analysts on average appear to 
understand that the Leaders have higher future earnings potential than Followers.  
However, examining the revision in long-term growth estimates we find that the Leaders’ 
long-term growth estimates are revised downwards about 3.3% on average, while the 
Follower’s long-term growth estimates are revised downwards about 1.6%, which 
suggests that analysts appear to react to current earnings or stock price movements and 
hence, penalize Leaders more in their long-term outlook. Alternatively, the lack of 
information on R&D productivity seeps into the analysts’ earnings forecasts through their 
revisions. We also find that the standard deviation of the long-term growth forecasts is 
higher for Leaders than Followers, which suggests that the disagreement among analysts 
for Leaders is more than Followers. Such disagreements across sophisticated financial 
intermediaries on R&D productivity are most likely to occur due to lack of information. 
The change in standard deviation across Leaders and Followers is not statistically 
significant showing that the differences appear to persist. 
We contribute to the literature on R&D stock valuation in three ways. First, we 
establish a connection between innovation strategy and stock valuation; thus, 
emphasizing the importance of considering the nature of R&D in terms of the firms’ 
innovation strategy for stock valuation. We show that innovation strategy enhances stock 
value in the long-run.3 Second, we show that investors do not appear to get information in 
                                                 
3 This is similar in spirit of recent papers such as Chen et al. (2005), Gaur et al. (2005) and Hendricks and 
Singhal (2005) who examine the association between the nature of operations-related strategies and stock 
market valuation. 
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a timely fashion leading to a delayed reaction by investors for firms following an 
innovation strategy. Chan et al. (2001) show that the future excess returns for R&D 
intensive firms are driven by lower stock price valuation in the current year due to R&D 
firm’s earnings being depressed. Lev et al. (2005) find that investors do not appear to 
undo the bias created by the conservative treatment of R&D in the financial statement. 
These findings could be driven by behavioral reasons or lack of information. Our 
evidence suggests that lack of information is the more likely cause for the delayed 
reaction, because stock returns volatility and future earnings variability of R&D Leaders 
is lower than that of Followers. Even sophisticated financial analysts revise their long-
term growth estimates downwards, which potentially suggests lack of information. 
Collectively, these findings imply that firms following an innovation strategy need to 
establish effective communications with investors so as to reduce the information schism 
(see Coyne and Witter 2002). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides the 
characteristics of Leaders and Followers; Section III examines the stock market valuation 
of Leaders and Followers; Section IV examines the association of risk measures of 
Leaders and Followers; Section V examines the financial analysts’ long-term earnings 
growth forecasts; and Section VI contains some concluding remarks. 
 
II. Characteristics of Leaders and Followers 
Research in economics provides insights into the interactions between strategy, 
competition and innovation activities. Caves and Porter (1977) develop a framework for 
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intra-industry profit differentials  based on pre-commitment to specialized resources such 
as R&D. Caves and Ghemawat (1992) examine the factors that sustain profit differentials 
across firms within an industry and find that differentiation-related strategies which 
includes R&D, play a more important role than cost-related strategies. Differentiation-
related strategies are indicative of innovative leadership in the product market, i.e., new 
products/services, brands, etc. while cost-related strategies include higher capacity and 
cost structure advantages. Gruber (1992) shows that in a vertically differentiated product 
market where fixed costs of innovation decline over time, innovation leaders are 
persistent. For example, in the Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories (EPROM) 
market, Intel which invented the memory chip has persistently held leadership in 
innovative activity. Klette (1996) shows that R&D could help improve future profitability 
due to knowledge-spillovers across lines of business: R&D could have a lasting impact 
on performance due to knowledge-spillovers. Cardinal and Opler (1995) show that 
diversified firms are at least as efficient as non-diversified firms with respect to R&D 
expenditures, which is likely due to economies of scope. In summary, the evidence on 
interaction between business strategy, competition and innovation suggests that R&D 
leadership provides sustained future performance through a combination of (a) 
knowledge-spillovers, (b) provision of differentiated products, and (c) economies of 
scope.  
The innovation race literature provides some intuition on who could be 
considered R&D Leaders. One of the most contentious issues has been the capacity for 
innovation activities to sustain monopoly power, i.e., interaction between strategy and 
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innovation races. On the one hand, Reinganum (1985) shows that incumbent firms have 
less incentives to invest in R&D and hence entrants overtake incumbents, even though 
incumbents make more profits in the short-term: the driving force in this model is 
diminishing returns to R&D investment. On the other hand, Gilbert and Newbery (1982) 
examine a setting where incremental innovations are awarded with certainty to the firm 
that spends the most on R&D and show that the incumbent firm continues to earn 
monopoly rents. Lerner (1997) empirically examines the interactions between strategy, 
competition and innovation activities in the disk drive industry and finds support for 
Reinganum’s theoretical insights, i.e., the entrant firm shows a higher propensity to 
innovate and ends-up with higher profits in the long-run. Banbury and Mitchell (1995) 
show that incremental product innovation in the cardiac pacemaker industry helps the 
incumbent sustain and increase profits, by increasing their market share as well as 
decrease the likelihood of business dissolution, providing some degree of support for 
Gilbert and Newbery’s insight. Intuitively, both the cases are characterized by the firm 
spending the most in R&D, having a higher performance in the future. Zahra and Covin 
(1993) provide evidence that suggests that high-performing companies adopt a coherent 
set of technological choices that, taken together, create a competitive advantage; 
especially in mature sectors where technology plays a prominent role. 
Based on the insights from the strategy and economics literature we use R&D 
expenditure to classify Leaders and Followers: Specifically, we use industry adjusted 
R&D intensity measures to classify R&D Leaders and Followers. Two proxies are used 
for R&D intensity: R&D expenditure to sales ratio and R&D expenditure to market value 
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of equity ratio. We use industry benchmarks to classify Leaders and Followers for two 
reasons. First, for industries such as chemicals or pharmaceuticals where the same firm 
continues to wield Leadership in product innovations (such as, DuPont, Dow Chemical, 
Merck, Pfizer), the R&D intensity of such firms compared with others in the industry 
should be higher (such as Chattem Inc., Mylan Laboratories, Natures Sunshine, Igi Inc. 
and Icn. Pharmaceutical). Second, the industry adjusted R&D intensity calibrates for the 
competitive forces operating within the industry. For instance, even a Follower in the 
pharmaceutical industry could have a higher R&D intensity than that of a Leader in the 
food products industry.  
The benchmark R&D intensity for the industry is the value-weighted R&D 
expenditure to sales of all firms in the industry group, as well as the value-weighted R&D 
expenditure to market value of equity of all firms in the industry group; where the value-
weights are computed using sales and market value of equity, respectively. For the 
industry groups, we use the mapping of the four-digit SIC to the 48 industry group as in 
Fama-French (1997).4 Firms whose R&D intensity is greater than (less than or equal to) 
that of the benchmark R&D intensity for the industry are classified as R&D Leaders 
(Followers).  
The sample includes all firms with positive R&D expenditures from 1975 through 
2002 with financial information available in the Compustat annual database. We delete 
firms with either sales less than $10 million or total assets less than $5 million so as to 
include reasonably sized firms. We obtain R&D expenditures (data item # 46) and sales 
                                                 
4 The mapping was obtained from Ken French’s website 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html . 
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(data item # 12) from the Compustat annual database; data on stock price and number of 
shares outstanding to compute market value of equity are obtained from the CRSP 
database.  
Table 1, Panel A contains some characteristics of Leaders and Followers. There 
are about 550 (400) firms each year that are classified as R&D Leaders, while 717 (867) 
firms are classified as Followers, when R&D to sales (R&D to market value) ratio is used 
as the R&D intensity measure. The percentage of Leaders has been increasing over time: 
37% of the companies are Leaders in 1975 as compared to about 50% in 1997, which 
shows the importance of innovation in recent years.  
Panels B and C of Table 1 provide evidence on the persistence of our 
classification of R&D Leaders and Followers, respectively. Examining the persistence of 
our classification is important to assess whether the R&D intensity measures capture 
innovation as a strategy: if innovation is a strategic choice and strategic choices are 
difficult to change in the short-run, then our classification should exhibit some degree of 
persistence. Panel B shows whether firms classified as Leaders in year t continue to be 
Leaders in subsequent years. About 54% of the firms classified as Leaders in year t 
continue to be classified as Leaders, while 26% of the firms classified as Leaders in year t 
are classified as Followers and 20% of the firms do not survive in year t+4. Panel C 
shows the classification in years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 of Followers. About 58% of the 
firms classified as Followers in year t continue to be classified as Followers, while 17% 
of the firms classified as Followers in year t are classified as Leaders and 25% of the 
firms do not survive in year t+4. This shows that the survival rate of Leaders is higher 
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than the survival rate of Followers. Furthermore, the misclassification of a Leader as a 
Follower appears to be higher than the misclassification of a Follower as a Leader, i.e., 
fewer Followers become Leaders in subsequent years, while more Leaders become 
Followers. Overall, the classification of Leaders and Followers exhibit a certain degree of 
persistence. 
Examining the Pharmaceutical industry we find that the following firms are 
classified as Leaders: Eli Lilly in 19 of the 19 years; Pfizer in 18 of the 23 years; Merck 
in 19 of 23 years; while generic drug manufacturers are classified as R&D Followers: 
Chattem Inc. in 23 of the 23 years; Mylan Labs in 21 out of 22; Natures Sunshine in 17 
out of 17 years; Igi Inc. in 15 out of 15 years; Icn Pharmaceutical in 13 out of 14 years. 
Similarly, in the chemical industry the R&D Leaders are: Dow Chemical in 21 out of 23 
years; Dupont in 15 out of 23 years, Rohm & Haas in 23 out of 23 years and Rogers Co. 
in 23 out of 23 years. While the R&D Followers are: Lawter International in 23 out of 23 
years, Crompton in 20 out of 21 years and Sun Coast Industries in 10 out of 10 years are 
classified as Followers. This also provides some degree of validation on the classification 
scheme.  
Table 2, Panel A provides some descriptive statistics of Leaders’ and Followers’ 
performance when R&D to sales ratio for classification. The R&D to sales ratio of 
Leaders is on average 5½ times that of Followers: the mean (median) R&D to sales of 
Leaders is 11.57 (7.71) while that of Followers is 2.09 (1.41).  The R&D to market value 
of equity is on average 2½ times higher for the Leaders than the Followers, indicating 
that investors appear to impute some of the benefits of R&D in stock prices. Similarly, 
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the book-to-market, sales-to-market and earnings-to-price ratios of Leaders are much 
lower than that of Followers, indicating that investors recognize that the Leaders are more 
intangible intensive. The return on equity of Leaders is negative while that of Followers 
is positive, which could be due to the accounting convention/rule of writing-off R&D 
expenditures. The mean (median) dividend yield computed as dividends (data item #21) 
divided by market value of firm is 1.22% (zero%) for Leaders and 1.97% (1.05%) for 
Followers, i.e., on average the Leaders appear to retain more of the earnings possibly due 
to better investment opportunities. The sales growth as well as the industry-adjusted sales 
growth of Leaders is 33% higher than that of Followers, but Followers have a higher 
market share. The mean (median) accounting information based measures of size such as 
sales, total assets and book value of equity of Leaders are  $1167m ($80m), $1173m 
($77m) and $456m ($46m), respectively; while the corresponding mean (median) of 
Followers are  $1304m ($131m), $1309m ($98m) and $473m ($48m). This suggests that 
Followers are in general larger sized companies with larger brick and mortar operations. 
However, the mean (median) market value of equity of Leaders is $1009m ($94m) and 
that of Followers is  $948m ($68m), which shows that the investors recognize at least a 
portion of the intangible intensity (R&D intensity) in their valuations. The mean (median) 
net income for Leaders is 57.16 (3.18) and for Followers 61.38 (4.48). Although the 
difference in mean is not statistically significant, the median income of Leaders is 
statistically smaller than that of Followers. Overall, the results indicate that Leaders’ 
earnings are depressed in the short-run possibly due to conservative accounting treatment 
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of R&D expenditures. Table 1, Panel B shows similar characteristics across Leaders and 
Followers, when R&D to market value of equity is used for classification. 
In Panels A and B of Table 2, Followers have higher profitability ratios like return 
on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) and earnings-to-price (EP) than Leaders when 
these ratios are computed based on net income. To assess the impact of R&D 
expenditures on these profitability ratios, we add back R&D expenditures to net income. 
We find that the adjusted profitability ratios of Leaders are higher than that of Followers 
showing that the Leaders’ bottom line earnings are significantly impacted by R&D 
spending. 
Overall, the evidence in Table 2 shows that Leaders are more intangible intensive 
firms with higher sales growth; but financial information in annual reports show them as 
poor performers which could be due to the conservative treatment of R&D expenditures. 
This is consistent with the arguments and findings of Chan et al. (2003), Lev (2003) and 
Lev and Sougiannis (1996).  
Table 3 contains some future performance metrics for Leaders and Followers, i.e., 
we track the performance of firms classified as Leaders in year t over subsequent years 
t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4. We do this to assess whether Leaders have higher future 
performance in terms of sales growth, return on assets and market share than Followers. 
Conversely, if Leaders do not exhibit future performance similar to that of Followers, 
then this could provide one reason for why R&D firms earn returns similar to that of non-
R&D firms. Panels A and B provide the industry-adjusted and the levels of sales growth 
and return on assets for Leaders and Followers. In general, Leaders exhibit higher sales 
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growth and return on assets over the four subsequent years. Panel C shows that although 
Followers have a slightly higher market share in year t, starting from year t+1 Leaders 
have a higher market share. These results indicate that Leaders’ strategic choice pays off 
in terms of future performance. 
Overall, the evidence in Table 3 suggests that R&D expenditures help Leaders 
achieve higher performance in future years. Combined with the evidence in Table 2, 
these results indicate that although Leaders show a lower performance with respect to 
accounting net income, their strategic decision of being a Leader in their industry pays 
off in the future with higher ROA and higher sales growth. 
In the next section we examine the stock market valuation of the Leaders and 
Followers. 
 
III. Stock Valuation of Leaders and Followers 
In the previous section we find that R&D Leaders have lower performance in the 
contemporaneous year, but sustained higher performance for at least the next four years. 
In this section, we examine the future excess returns of Leaders and Followers to gain 
insights into mispricing or inadequate control for risk. Following CLS (Chan et al. 2003) 
each firm in the sample is assigned to a companion portfolio based on its ranking by size 
and book-to-market. For the companion portfolio the book-to-market ratios are classified 
into five equal groups at the end of April each year; the size breakpoints are determined 
by classifying the NYSE companies into five equal groups in April each year. The group 
representing the smallest size is further divided into two equal groups.  Thus, we have 
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five groups for the book-to-market ratio and six groups for size to determine the 
companion portfolio of book-to-market and size that each company belongs. The monthly 
risk-adjusted excess returns are then computed as the difference the firm’s monthly return 
minus the companion portfolio’s value-weighted monthly return. The annual excess 
returns are obtained by cumulating the monthly excess returns. Similar to CLS, we track 
the Leaders’ and Followers’ excess returns for four subsequent years.  
If the nature of both Leaders’ and Followers’ R&D activity are similar then, we 
expect to find similar excess returns for both. In other words, if risk-adjusted excess 
returns for both Leaders and Followers are similar and positive then our risk adjustments 
may not be adequate. Of course this could also suggest that the investors do not 
understand all types of R&D activity. 
Table 4, Panel A provides the risk-adjusted excess returns for Leaders and 
Followers in the four years subsequent to the year in which firms are classified as 
Leaders and Followers using R&D to sales ratio. For Followers the excess returns in 
years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 are 0.79%, 0.01%, 0.07% and 0.34%, respectively; none of 
which is statistically different from zero. This suggests that investors understand and 
appropriately value the R&D activity of Followers. On the other hand, for  Leaders the 
excess returns in years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 are 1.78%, 7.59%, 4.00% and 2.78%, 
respectively; all of which are statistically different from zero. This suggests that investors 
do not understand and appropriately value the R&D activity of the Leaders. Note that the 
R&D Leaders’ current profitability is low but the future profitability is high. More 
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importantly, the R&D Leaders’ future profitability is higher than that of Followers (see 
Section II), which is not recognized by the market till the profits are realized.  
An alternative argument would be that investors’ perceive R&D activity of 
Leaders to be more risky and our risk adjustments are not complete. To shed light on this, 
we examine the hedge portfolio returns. The hedge portfolio returns is the difference 
between the Leaders and the Followers returns in the subsequent years. The idea here is 
that if the investors perceive the R&D activity of the Leaders to be more risky, then the 
difference in the excess returns across Leaders and Followers should be a constant. The 
hedge portfolio returns are t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 are 0.99%, 7.58%, 3.93% and 2.44%, 
which suggests that at least a portion of the excess returns in years t+2 and t+3 are due 
investors’ under-valuation of the R&D activity of Leaders.  
Table 4, Panel B provides the risk-adjusted excess returns for Leaders and 
Followers in the four years subsequent to the year in which firms are classified as 
Leaders and Followers based on R&D to market value of equity ratio. The results are 
similar and more striking than the results when R&D to sales ratio is used. When R&D to 
market value of equity is used to classify firms into Leaders and Followers, if the 
investors have valued the future profit prospects of R&D correctly, then they are more 
likely to be classified as a Follower. Alternatively, if the market has undervalued the 
innovation activity of the firm such that the prior market value of equity is much lower, 
then the firm is more likely to be classified as a Leader. Thus, if the investors do not 
value the R&D activity appropriately for want of good information pertaining to 
intangible activity, the results in Panel B are expected to be more striking.  
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Table 5 provides the risk-adjusted excess returns for Leaders and Followers in the 
four years subsequent to the year in which portfolios are formed. In Panel A (B) the 
portfolios are based on whether the firm is a Leader or Follower in years t and t-1 based 
on R&D to sales (market value of equity) ratio. Here we examine whether the investors 
value the R&D activity of firms that are consistently Leaders. The results are similar to 
that reported in Table 4. 
Table 6 provides the results using an alternative risk adjustment procedure 
following Fama and French (1993, 1996). The model is estimated using monthly returns 
from each of the three years following portfolio formation for Leaders and Followers. 
Specifically, we estimate the following model. 
      Rit – Rft   =  b0i  + b1i [ Rmt - Rft ]  + b2i SMBt  +  b3i  HMLt +  b4i  UMDt +eit      (1) 
where Rit is the value-weighted monthly return of portfolio i in month t, Rft is the treasury 
bill rate in month t, Rmt is the value-weighted monthly market index, SMBt and HMLt are 
the returns on the Fama and French (1993) factor-mimicking portfolios for size and book-
to-market, respectively, UMDt is the momentum returns on a portfolio of past winners 
(top quintile) and past losers (bottom quintile).  
Table 6 provides the estimates of equation (1) for Leaders and Followers in the 
four years subsequent to the year in which firms are classified as Leaders and Followers 
based on R&D to sales ratio. The difference in the monthly risk-adjusted returns captured 
by the intercept (b0) across Leaders and Followers in years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 are 
0.11%, 0.32%, 0.34% and 0.21%, respectively, which corresponds to risk-adjusted annual 
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returns of 1.32%, 3.84%, 4.08% and 2.52% in the corresponding years. These findings 
are consistent with those in Tables 4 and 5.  
Other sensitivity tests 
First, the mean risk-adjusted returns for years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 is computed 
for Leaders and Followers in year t and the difference in average returns is compared 
each year. When R&D to sales is used to classify Leaders and Followers, Leaders have a 
significantly higher average four year ahead risk-adjusted returns in 8 out of 23 years, 
and most of these belong to the 1990s. On the other hand, Followers have significantly 
higher average four year ahead risk-adjusted returns in 2 out of the 23 years. When R&D 
to market value of equity is used to classify Leaders and Followers we find that Leaders 
have a significantly higher average four year ahead risk-adjusted returns in 13 out of the 
23 years, while Followers do not have significantly higher average four year ahead risk-
adjusted returns in any of the years. This provides further corroboration of our earlier 
conclusion. 
Second, we define the top (bottom) quartile of the industry-adjusted R&D 
expenditure to sales firms as Leaders (Followers). The difference between the average 
four year ahead risk-adjusted excess returns across Leaders and Followers increases to 
4.38% as against 3.74% (see Panel A of Table 4) in the original classification. Similarly, 
we define the top (bottom) quartile of the industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to market 
value of equity firms as Leaders (Followers). The results show that a finer classification 
criterion increases the future risk-adjusted excess returns and shows that the result is not 
driven by marginal Leaders.  
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To summarize the evidence presented we find that (a) Leaders have lower 
earnings, and return on equity in the year of portfolio formation as compared to 
Followers, (b) Leaders have higher sales growth and return on equity than Followers in 
four years following portfolio formation, (c) Leaders have a positive risk-adjusted excess 
returns in four years following portfolio formation; while the Followers have zero future 
risk-adjusted excess returns, and (d) the difference in risk-adjusted excess returns 
between R&D Leaders and Followers declines over time. All of these indicate that 
investors’ do not appear to value the R&D Leaders appropriately, because of lack of 
information on the nature of R&D. In the next section we examine whether measures of 
risk such as stock return volatility and future earnings variability is higher or lower for 
Leaders than Followers. 
 
IV. Stock Returns and Future Earnings Volatility of Leaders and 
Followers 
In this section we examine the association between R&D expenditures of Leaders 
and Followers and (a) future stock return volatility, which is a measure of investors’ 
perceived risk (see Froot et al. 1992) and (b) future earnings variability, which is an ex 
post measure that indicates whether R&D leads to more volatile earnings stream and thus 
increased risk (see Beaver et al. 1970). 
Stock returns volatility and R&D Leaders  
Froot et al. (1992) argue that high stock return volatility can increase a firm’s 
perceived risk, thereby raising its cost of capital. Following this argument, if investors 
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perceive Leaders to be more risky than Followers, we expect the stock return volatility of 
Leaders to be higher than that of Followers. 
To examine this, we augment Bushee and Noe’s (2000) model and estimate the 
following equation. 
STDRETt+1 =  [Fixed year effects] + β1RNDMt + βL1LEADERt RNDMt + β2ARt + β3VOLt  
+ β4LMVt+ β5LEVt+ β6DMt+ β7EPt+ β8BMt+ β9SGt + β10GROWTHt  
+ β11STDGRt + β12NUMESTt + β13CHGRt + β14CHSTDt + error  (2) 
where STDRET is the stock return volatility computed as the log of standard deviation of 
daily stock returns measured from May of year t+1 to April of year t+2 (see Bushee and 
Noe, 2000); RNDM is the R&D expenditure to market value of equity in year t; 
LEADER is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the industry-adjusted R&D 
intensity is greater than zero in year t; AR is the size and book-to-market adjusted excess 
returns cumulated from May of year t to April of year t+1; VOLS is the mean monthly 
trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the month 
computed from May of year t to April of year t+1; LMV is the log of market value of 
equity on December 31st of year t; EP is the earnings to price ratio computed as the 
income before extraordinary items divided by the market value; DM is the dividend 
yield; LEV is the leverage computed as long-term debt divided by total assets;  BM is the 
book-to-market ratio; SG is the sales growth from year t-1 to year t; GROWTH is the 
average of analysts’ mean long-term earnings growth forecast from May of year t to April 
of year t+1;  STDGR is the average of the standard deviation of the analysts’ long-term 
growth forecasts from May of year t to April of year t+1; NUMEST is the average 
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number of analysts following the firm in year t; CHGR and CHSTD are the change in 
mean and standard deviation of analysts’ long-term growth forecasts from year t-1 to t. 
The main difference between equation (2) and Bushee and Noe (2000) is the 
inclusion of the test variables: RNDM and the interaction of Leaders and RNDM. 
Consistent with observations made in earlier, if investors react to R&D efforts by 
considering R&D to be more risky due to behavioral reasons, we expect stock return 
volatility to be positively associated with RNDM (see Lang and Lundholm, 1993). On the 
other hand if investors understand that Leaders have adopted an innovation strategy, then 
the perceived risk should be lower for them. Hence, we expect the interaction between 
Leaders and RNDM to be negative. In other words, we expect the Leaders to have less 
stock return volatility, i.e., less perceived risk.  
AR, VOL, LMV, LEV, EP, BM, DM and SG are control variables (see Bushee 
and Noe, 2000). In addition to these variables, we include variables related to the 
information environment as captured by the analysts’ long-term growth estimates, and the 
corresponding standard deviation. Previous research on firm’s disclosure practices and 
stock return volatility documents a positive association between the two; indicating that 
better information environment is positively associated with stock return volatility (see 
Lang and Lundholm, 1993). GROWTH, STD and NUMEST are the controls for the 
information environment. 
Consistent with our earlier sample selection criteria, we consider only firms with 
both sales greater than $10 million and total assets greater than $5 million. Furthermore, 
we require that at least three analysts provide long-term growth forecasts such that the 
 25
standard deviation of long term growth forecasts is a meaningful measure. The sample for 
estimating equation (2) contains 5,536 firm-year observations.  
Table 7, Panel B contains the results of estimating equation (2) without RNDM 
and the interaction between RNDM and LEADERS, i.e., a replication of Bushee and Noe 
(2000) so as to establish a benchmark for our sample. The coefficient estimates on the 
control variables are similar to that of Bushee and Noe (2000). The coefficient estimates 
on the information environment variables are positive suggesting that Lang and 
Lundholm’s (1993) conjecture that firms facing more information asymmetry (as proxied 
by stock return volatility) are the ones for whom there is a demand for better disclosure 
environments (as proxied by financial intermediaries). 
The last two columns of Table 7, Panel B contain the results of estimating 
equation (2) including our test variables. RNDM is positively associated with future stock 
return volatility and the interaction between Leaders and RNDM, is negatively associated 
with future stock return volatility. This broadly supports the conjecture that the future 
excess returns for Leaders documented in the previous section is not due to risk.  
Future earnings variability and R&D Leaders 
We examine whether the nature of R&D of Leaders is such that it results in 
increased future earnings variability compared to that of Followers. Kothari et al. (2002) 
hereafter referred to as KLL; develop a research design that relates ex post variability of 
earnings to R&D expenditures and capital expenditures. The premise of examining future 
earnings variability is based on Beaver et al.’s (1970) findings that earnings variability 
and the systematic risk measured by beta obtained from the CAPM model are positively 
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associated. The motivation for their study is to provide evidence on whether the nature of 
research activity is similar or different than capital expenditures in inducing earnings 
variability. We augment KLL’s model and estimate the marginal difference on the R&D 
coefficient between the Leaders and the Followers as follows: 
SD(EPSt+1, t+5) = [Industry Fixed Effects] + β1t RNDMt +βL2t LEADERt RNDMt  
+ β2t CapExt + βL1t LEADERt CapExt  + β3t LMVt + β4t LEVt + errort+1,t+5    (3) 
where SD(Et+1,t+5) is the standard deviation of earnings per share before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations (data item # 58); the standard deviation is calculated 
using five annual earnings observations for years t+1 through t+5 and each earnings 
observation is deflated by the stock price, P, at the beginning of the period t; RNDM is 
the R&D expenditure (data item # 46) to market value of equity (data item # 199 times 
data item # 54) in year t; LEADER is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the 
industry adjusted R&D intensity computed based on R&D to sales of the firm is greater 
than zero in year t; CapExt is the capital expenditure per share (data item # 128), deflated 
by P; LMVt is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of year t; and 
LEVt is the ratio of long-term debt (data item # 9 plus data item # 34) to the market value 
of equity plus long-term debt, both at the end of year t. We estimate regression model (3) 
for only the non-zero R&D firms, while KLL consider both firms with and without R&D.  
The main difference between our regression model (3) and KLL’s model is the 
inclusion of the two interaction terms of R&D expenditures with Leaders and capital 
expenditures with Leaders.  We allow for the coefficient on capital expenditures to be 
different across R&D Leaders and Followers, to allow for the possibility that the 
sustained competitive advantage could lead to higher utilization of the facilities. Note that 
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while KLL’s focus was on the relative weights on RNDM and CapEx in inducing 
earnings variability our focus is on the differential impact of R&D across Leaders and 
Followers. The intuition behind this research design is that if Leaders earnings variability 
is similar or lower than that of the Followers, then the earlier evidence of stock market 
valuation wherein the Follower firms do not exhibit risk-adjusted excess returns, while 
the Leader firms do, is likely driven by the investor’s lack of information. Thus, we 
expect βL1t, βL2t to be negative or zero. LMV and LEV are the control variables for our 
purpose (see KLL).  
We obtain financial data from the Compustat Annual Industrial and Annual 
Research files for the period 1975-2002 with all available data. For all the variables 
except P, the values are for fiscal year t or at the end of fiscal year t. In contrast, P is 
measured at the end of fiscal year t-1 because they are used as deflators. Per share values 
of P and future earnings, EPSt+1 to EPSt+5, are adjusted for stock splits and stock 
dividends using the cumulative adjustment factor, Compustat data #27, so that they are 
comparable to the per share values of the remaining variables for year t. Since earnings 
variability is calculated using data for five years following year t, the last year of the 
sample period is 1997. Even though earnings variability is calculated using five years of 
future earnings data, to avoid survivor bias, we do not require earnings data availability 
for years t+1 to t+5 for a firm year to be included in the data. In cases where earnings 
data are missing in any of the periods from t+1 through t+5, the standard deviation of 
earnings, SD(EPSt+1,t+5) is set equal to the mean of SD(EPSt+1,t+5) for the firms in the 
same Altman Z-Score decile portfolio in year t (see KLL). Consistent with our earlier 
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sample selection criteria we delete firms with sales revenue less than $10 million and 
Total Assets less than $5 million. The sample contains 27,458 firm-year observations. 
Note that the definition of LEV and LMV are different from that used for estimating 
equation (2). This is because we keep the definitions consistent with that of KLL.  
Table 8, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for estimating equation (3). Firms 
on average spend 11.46% of the stock price on capital expenditures and 6.97% of the 
stock price on R&D expenditures indicating that the outlays are substantial. The mean 
(median) standard deviation of earnings deflated by stock price is 4.17% (3.33%), 
ranging from 0.14% to 45.96%. In unreported analysis we find that on average the 
standard deviation of earnings vary considerably through time. 
Table 8, Panel B provides the mean of the annual cross-section estimates of 
regression model (3) for the whole sample, i.e., replication of KLL. We do this to 
establish a benchmark since we consider only R&D firms. Similar to KLL we find that 
the coefficient on R&D expenditure is 0.0760 while the coefficient estimate on CapEx is 
0.0169. That is R&D expenditures contribute about 4.5 times more than CapEx to 
earnings variability indicating that the nature of R&D activity is more “risky” as opposed 
to traditional “brick and mortar” expenditures.  
The estimates of equation (3) are contained in the last two columns of Table 8, 
Panel B. The coefficient estimate on the interaction between Leaders and R&D 
expenditures is negative and significantly different from zero, the mean βL2t over the 23 
years is -0.0321. The results indicate that the R&D spending for Leaders are less risky 
than that of the Followers’ R&D spending, showing that R&D Leaders have more 
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effective R&D which decreases future earnings variability. Also, the future earnings 
variability induced by capital expenditures is lower for the Leaders as evidenced by the 
negative coefficient on the interaction between Leaders and CapEx (-0.0171). This 
suggests that R&D activity of Leaders on average is geared towards improving the 
manufacturing and delivery processes, i.e., process R&D which in turn results in 
decreasing the risk of capital expenditures.  
Overall, the evidence suggests that the nature of R&D activity of Leaders does not 
induce additional future earnings variability; and that the nature of R&D activity is such 
that it mitigates future earnings variability induced by capital expenditures. More 
importantly, this evidence does not support the incomplete risk adjustment argument for 
the risk-adjusted excess returns of R&D Leaders. In addition, the evidence also suggests 
that information on the nature of R&D activity in terms of product versus process 
oriented R&D would enhance the information available to investors, essentially because 
some of the R&D activity could have indirect benefits by improving the effectiveness of 
brick and mortar operations. 
 
V. Do Financial Analysts Incorporate the Future Profitability of 
R&D Leaders? 
In this section, we examine whether financial analysts incorporate the future 
profitability potential of Leaders into their earnings forecasts. Financial analysts typically 
provide up to two years ahead earnings forecasts as well as a long-term growth estimate 
of earnings applicable to three to five years ahead (i.e., medium-term) horizon. If the 
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financial analysts mitigate the information schism between the investors and the firm, 
which is one of their main roles, they must incorporate the increased potential of future 
profits of Leaders in their long-term growth estimates.  
Table 9, Panel A provides the results of comparing the financial analysts’ long-
term forecasts across Leaders and Followers. The number of analysts following the 
Leaders and Followers are similar with about 7 analysts following the firms. The mean 
(median) R&D expenditure to market value of equity for Leaders and Followers are 8% 
(6%) and 3% (2%), respectively, which is consistent with the observations in Table 2. 
The mean (median) long-term growth forecast for Leaders and Followers are 19% 
(17%) and 14% (13%), respectively; which constitutes on average a 5% higher long-term 
growth forecast for Leaders than Followers. This shows that financial analysts on average 
incorporate the higher earnings potential of Leaders into their long-term earnings 
forecasts.  However, examining the revision in long-term growth estimates we find that 
the Leaders’ long-term growth estimates are revised downwards about 3.3% on average, 
while the Follower’s long-term growth estimates are revised downwards about 1.6%, 
which suggests that analysts appear to react to current earnings or stock price movements 
and hence, penalize Leaders more in their long-term outlook. Alternatively, the lack of 
information on R&D productivity appears to seep into analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
The mean (median) standard deviation of long-term growth forecasts for Leaders 
and Followers are 4.5 (3.8) and 3.6 (2.8), respectively, which suggests that the 
disagreements among analysts for Leaders is more than that for Followers. Such 
disagreements across sophisticated financial intermediaries on R&D productivity are 
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most likely to occur due to lack of information. The change in standard deviation across 
Leaders and Followers is not statistically significant showing that the differences appear 
to persist. 
In Table 9, Panels B and C we repeat the analysis contained in Table 4 by 
partitioning the sample into firms with greater than three analysts following and all the 
rest. Table 9, Panel B provides the risk-adjusted excess returns for Leaders and Followers 
in the subsequent four years for firms with more than two analysts. For Followers, the 
excess returns in years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 are 0.72%, -0.50%, 0.07% and 1.34%, 
respectively. This suggests that analysts help investors understand and appropriately 
value the R&D activity of Followers. On the other hand, for Leaders the excess returns in 
years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 are 4.08%, 10.83%, 6.09% and 4.17%, respectively. This 
suggests that analysts do not help to mitigate the information schism with respect to R&D 
Leaders. 
Table 9, Panel C provides the risk-adjusted excess returns for Leaders and 
Followers in the subsequent four years with less than three analysts. For Followers the 
excess returns in years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 are 0.81%, 0.13%, 0.08% and 0.11%, 
respectively. This suggests that even without the help of analysts, investors understand 
and appropriately value the R&D activity of the Followers. On the other hand, for the 
Leaders the excess returns in years t+1, t+2, t+3 and t+4 are 1.09%, 6.63%, 3.38% and 
2.36%, respectively; all of which are statistically significant. This pattern is similar to 
what we observed in Panel B.  
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The results in Panels B and C of Table 9 suggest that financial intermediaries do 
not play a role in mitigating or alleviating the lack of information. This could be due to 
lack of uniform information that is provided to them, which can be used to compare, 
analyze and evaluate the prospects of Leaders such that investors can make informed 
decisions.  
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we examined the future excess returns of R&D intensive firms. 
Firms with R&D intensity measure greater than (lesser than or equal to) that of the 
industry are classified as Leaders (Followers). We show that Leaders have sustained 
future profitability.  However, the future risk-adjusted excess returns are higher for 
Leaders than Followers, suggesting that the stock price does not incorporate the R&D 
relevant information in a timely fashion. We then directly examine the difference across 
Leaders and Followers of two risk measures: stock return volatility and future earnings 
variability. We find that Leaders have lower stock return volatility and earnings 
variability, ceteris paribus. We then examine whether the financial analysts’ help mitigate 
the apparent lack of information with respect to R&D, and find that even though the long-
term earnings growth estimates for Leaders is high, they revise these estimates 
downwards perhaps as a reaction to short-term earnings. Overall, it appears that the stock 
market does not incorporate the Leaders’ potential for sustained future profits as argued 
in the strategy and economics literatures. 
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These findings have several important implications. First, collectively the results 
demonstrate the need for firms to establish effective communications strategies with 
investors so as to reduce the information schism, especially for firms pursuing innovation 
strategies (see Coyne and Witter 2002). Secondly, the results demonstrate the importance 
of incorporating additional disclosures of research and development activities of firms in 
the annual reports. This information could be in the form of disclosures in footnotes and 
need not be incorporated in the financial statements themselves. Future research on 
whether improved disclosure of R&D activity enables investors to value R&D firms more 
appropriately will provide insights into effective communication strategy to help 
investors’ value firms with innovation strategy. 
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TABLE 1: Classification of R&D Leaders and Followers 
 
PANEL A: Number of firms classified as Leaders and Followers 
  R&D Intensity: R&D to Sales R&D Intensity: R&D to Market Value 
Year Leaders Followers 
Leaders as % of 
Total Leaders Followers 
Leaders as % of 
Total 
1975 439 746 37.05 502 683 42.36 
1976 461 716 39.17 469 708 39.85 
1977 449 680 39.77 416 713 36.85 
1978 419 661 38.80 332 748 30.74 
1979 412 651 38.76 319 744 30.01 
1980 419 616 40.48 343 692 33.14 
1981 421 623 40.33 344 700 32.95 
1982 431 629 40.66 330 730 31.13 
1983 436 670 39.42 264 842 23.87 
1984 478 711 40.20 270 919 22.71 
1985 494 679 42.11 271 902 23.10 
1986 486 680 41.68 278 888 23.84 
1987 484 688 41.30 295 877 25.17 
1988 512 688 42.67 333 867 27.75 
1989 518 674 43.46 360 832 30.20 
1990 551 667 45.24 384 834 31.53 
1991 554 688 44.61 407 835 32.77 
1992 621 725 46.14 422 924 31.35 
1993 652 788 45.28 457 983 31.74 
1994 754 823 47.81 498 1079 31.58 
1995 787 844 48.25 525 1106 32.19 
1996 913 896 50.47 569 1240 31.45 
1997 950 959 49.76 821 1088 43.01 
Average 
number of 
firms 
550 717  43.37 400 867 31.60 
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PANEL B: Persistence of Leaders 
  Number of firms As percentage of Leaders in year (t) 
  
 
Followers  Leaders  
Not in 
sample Total  Followers  Leaders 
Not in 
sample Total 
Current year, year (t) 0 12,641 0 12,641 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 
One year after, year (t+1) 1,254 10,722 665 12,641 9.92 84.82 5.26 100.00 
Two  years after, year (t+2) 2,110 9,164 1,367 12,641 16.69 72.49 10.81 100.00 
Three  years after, year (t+3) 2,763 7,873 2,005 12,641 21.86 62.28 15.86 100.00 
Four  years after, year (t+4) 3,282 6,799 2,560 12,641 25.96 53.79 20.25 100.00 
 
PANEL C: Persistence of Followers 
  Number of firms As percentage of Followers in year (t) 
  
 
Followers  Leaders  
Not in 
sample Total  Followers  Leaders  
Not in 
sample Total 
Current year, year (t) 16,502 0 0 16,502 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
One year after, year (t+1) 14,180 1,125 1,197 16,502 85.93 6.82 7.25 100.00 
Two  years after, year (t+2) 12,285 1,854 2,363 16,502 74.45 11.24 14.32 100.00 
Three  years after, year (t+3) 10,819 2,368 3,315 16,502 65.56 14.35 20.09 100.00 
Four  years after, year (t+4) 9,648 2,756 4,098 16,502 58.47 16.70 24.83 100.00 
Notes: 
1. The sample contains all domestic NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms covered in CRSP and COMPUSTAT with non-zero R&D expenditures, Sales greater 
than $10 million and total assets greater than $5 million for the period 1975 to 1997. 
2. In Panels B and C the classification of Leaders and Followers is based on R&D expenditures to Sales. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
A firm is classified as a Leader in year t, if the industry-adjusted R&D intensity is greater than zero, and as a Follower otherwise. R&D intensity of each firm in 
year t is measured as (a) R&D expenditures in year t to sales in year t, and (b) R&D expenditures in year t to market value of equity four months subsequent to 
the fiscal year-end of year t. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the difference between the firm’s R&D expenditure to sales and the 
industry’s R&D to sales for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to sales with 
sales as value-weight. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to market value of equity is computed as the difference between the firm’s R&D expenditure to 
market value of equity minus the industry’s R&D to market value of equity for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to market value of 
equity is computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to market value of equity with market value of equity as value-weight. The industry R&D intensity is 
computed using the 48 industry groups as in Fama and French (1997).  
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TABLE 2: Characteristics of Leaders and Followers 
 
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics for Leaders and Followers when R&D intensity is R&D expenditure to sales 
  Mean Median 
   Difference   Difference 
Variables Leaders Followers t-stat p-value Leaders Followers z-stat p-value 
R&D expenditure to sales (%) 11.57 2.09 27.85 0.00 7.71 1.41 106.68 0.00 
R&D expenditure to market value of equity (%) 10.24 4.32 74.44 0.00 7.05 2.71 75.02 0.00 
Book-to-market value of equity 0.69 0.87 -23.50 0.00 0.53 0.71 -31.41 0.00 
Sales-to-market value of equity  1.73 2.97 -37.66 0.00 1.05 1.99 -52.42 0.00 
Earnings-to-stock price (%) 1.44 6.10 -7.63 0.00 5.03 7.47 -31.95 0.00 
Return on equity (%) -16.01 1.23 -2.04 0.04 10.17 12.03 -17.04 0.00 
Dividend yield (%) 1.22 1.97 -23.53 0.00 0.00 1.05 -32.75 0.00 
Sales growth (%) 34.09 22.34 2.05 0.04 12.82 10.24 9.25 0.00 
Industry-adjusted sales growth (%) 25.90 16.90 2.33 0.02 4.00 2.00 11.65 0.00 
Market share (%) 2.05 2.11 -0.71 0.47 0.13 0.20 -14.15 0.00 
Market value of equity ($ millions) 1009.13 947.46 1.10 0.27 93.58 68.18 12.37 0.00 
Sales  ($ millions) 1166.82 1304.25 -2.06 0.04 80.45 130.73 -20.35 0.00 
Net income ($ millions) 57.56 61.38 -0.85 0.39 3.18 4.48 -14.28 0.00 
Total asset ($ millions) 1173.00 1309.00 -1.55 0.12 76.81 97.66 -7.69 0.00 
Book value of equity ($ millions) 455.70 473.20 -0.73 0.46 46.22 47.76 -0.68 0.24 
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PANEL B: Descriptive statistics for Leaders and Followers when R&D intensity is R&D expenditure to market value of equity 
  Mean Median 
   Difference   Difference 
Variables Leaders Followers t-stat p-value Leaders Followers z-stat p-value 
R&D expenditure to sales (%) 10.78 4.09 21.85 0.00 5.36 1.99 56.55 0.00 
R&D expenditure to market value of equity (%) 13.54 3.82 71.13 0.00 10.17 2.74 104.09 0.00 
Book-to-market value of equity 0.70 1.00 30.34 0.00 0.57 0.80 36.30 0.00 
Sales-to-market value of equity  3.24 2.06 26.98 0.00 2.10 1.35 34.81 0.00 
Earnings-to-stock price (%) 1.38 5.33 -4.07 0.00 6.09 6.50 -8.83 0.00 
Return on equity (%) -28.50 4.03 -2.81 0.01 7.92 12.72 -36.34 0.00 
Dividend yield (%) 1.46 1.73 -7.65 0.00 0.00 0.56 -17.49 0.00 
Sales growth (%) 25.97 28.12 -2.03 0.04 9.21 12.15 -13.61 0.00 
Industry-adjusted sales growth (%) 19.09 21.77 -2.35 0.02 1.43 4.48 -9.45 0.00 
Market share (%) 2.07 2.10 -0.35 0.72 0.17 0.17 -1.20 0.22 
Market value of equity ($ millions) 474.20 1205.00 -15.62 0.00 46.24 103.20 -33.34 0.00 
Sales  ($ millions) 830.70 1435.00 -10.25 0.00 80.40 121.40 -16.77 0.00 
Net income ($ millions) 23.39 76.51 -14.06 0.00 1.63 5.50 -35.88 0.00 
Total asset ($ millions) 767.60 1473.00 -9.90 0.00 67.19 100.10 -16.78 0.00 
Book value of equity ($ millions) 291.30 546.10 -12.11 0.00 34.06 54.72 -21.59 0.00 
 
Notes: 
1. The sample contains all domestic NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms covered in CRSP and COMPUSTAT with non-zero R&D expenditures, sales greater 
than $10 million and total assets greater than $5 million for the period 1975 to 1997. 
2. In Panel A firms are classified as Leaders for the year if the industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is greater than zero; and as Followers otherwise. 
3. In Panel B firms are classified as Leaders for the year if the industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to market value of equity is greater than zero; and as 
Followers otherwise. 
4. The difference in the mean and median across the Leaders and Followers are based on the cross-section, pooled data.  
 
Variable Definitions: 
A firm is classified as a Leader in year t, if the industry-adjusted R&D intensity is greater than zero, and as a Follower otherwise. R&D intensity of each firm in 
year t is measured as (a) R&D expenditures in year t to sales in year t, and (b) R&D expenditures in year t to market value of equity four months subsequent to 
the fiscal year-end of year t. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the difference between the firm’s R&D expenditure to sales and the 
industry’s R&D to sales for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to sales with 
sales as value-weight. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to market value of equity is computed as the difference between the firm’s R&D expenditure to 
market value of equity minus the industry’s R&D to market value of equity for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to market value of 
equity is computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to market value of equity with market value of equity as value-weight. Market value is calculated as 
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share outstanding times price at the end of April. The industry R&D intensity is computed using the 48 industry groups as in Fama and French (1997). R&D 
expenditure to sales is R&D expenditure (Compustat data item # 46) divided by sales revenue (Compustat data item # 12). R&D expenditure to market value of 
equity is R&D expenditure divided by market value of equity. Book-to-market ratio is book value of equity (Compustat data item # 60) divided by market value 
of equity. Return on equity is net income (Compustat data item # 172) divided by book value of equity. Sales-to-market value of equity is sales (Compustat data 
item # 12) divided by market value of equity. Earning-to-Stock Price ratio is Net income (Compustat data item # 172) divided by market value of equity. 
Dividend yield is dividend (Compustat data item # 21) divided by market value of equity. Sales growth is change in sales between year (t) and year-(t-1) divided 
by sales in year (t-1). The industry market share for a firm is the firm’s sales divided by the total sales of the all firms in the same industry for that year. Total 
asset is (Compustat data item # 6).  
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TABLE 3: Leaders and Followers Future Performance 
 
PANEL A: Sales growth  
 Industry-adjusted Level 
   Difference   Difference 
 Leaders Followers t-stat p-value Leaders Followers t-stat p-value 
One year after, year (t+1) 8.81 4.14 11.45 0.00 15.88 11.17 11.96 0.00 
Two  years after, year (t+2) 8.87 4.03 12.89 0.00 15.21 10.59 3.77 0.00 
Three  years after, year (t+3) 8.67 3.94 15.26 0.00 14.57 10.34 3.39 0.00 
Four  years after, year (t+4) 12.00 4.23 15.00 0.00 17.36 9.89 3.88 0.00 
 
PANEL B: Return on asset  
 Industry-adjusted Level 
   Difference   Difference 
 Leaders Followers t-stat p-value Leaders Followers t-stat p-value 
One year after, year (t+1) 1.80 -2.17 22.38 0.00 20.38 16.64 22.05 0.00 
Two  years after, year (t+2) 1.36 -2.54 20.67 0.00 19.67 16.20 21.96 0.00 
Three  years after, year (t+3) 0.90 -2.80 18.60 0.00 18.98 15.87 18.52 0.00 
Four  years after, year (t+4) 0.03 -2.99 5.45 0.00 17.82 15.42 5.52 0.00 
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PANEL C: Industry market share 
   Difference 
 Leaders Followers t-stat p-value 
One year after, year (t+1) 1.70 1.46 3.79 0.00 
Two  years after, year (t+2) 1.81 1.51 4.51 0.00 
Three  years after, year (t+3) 1.95 1.57 5.32 0.00 
Four  years after, year (t+4) 2.09 1.63 6.03 0.00 
 
Notes: 
1. The sample contains all domestic NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms covered in CRSP and COMPUSTAT with non-zero R&D expenditures, sales greater 
than $10 million and total assets greater than $5 million for the period 1975 to 1997. 
2. Firms are classified as Leaders in year (t) if the industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is greater than zero; and Followers otherwise. The sales 
growth, return on assets and industry market share of the firms classified as Leaders and Followers in year (t) is tracked in the subsequent years.  
3. Industry-adjusted columns in Panel A is the mean of the difference between the firm’s sales growth in year (t+i) and the value-weighted industry sales 
growth in year (t+i) to which the firm belongs with sales in year (t+i) as the value-weights. 
4. Industry-adjusted columns in Panel B is the mean of the difference between the firm’s return on assets in year (t+i) and the value-weighted industry 
return on assets in year (t+i) to which the firm belongs, with return on assets in year (t+i) as value-weights. 
5.  In Panel A, if level of sales growth data are missing in any of the years from t+1 through t+4, it is set equal to mean sales growth of the firms in the same 
Altman Z-Score decile portfolio.  
6.  Similarly in Panel B, if level of ROA data are missing in any of the years from t+1 through t+4, it is set equal to mean sales growth of the firms in the 
same Altman Z-score decile portfolio. 
7.  All the ratios in all panels, sales, sales growth, industry-adjusted sales growth, ROA, industry-adjusted return on asset are multiplied by 100 to represent 
them in percentage. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
A firm is classified as a Leader in year t, if the industry-adjusted R&D intensity is greater than zero, and as a Follower otherwise. R&D intensity of each firm 
in year t is measured as R&D expenditures (data#46) in year t to sales (data#12) in year t. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the 
difference between the firm’s R&D expenditure to sales and the industry’s R&D to sales for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to sales 
is computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to sales with sales as value-weight. The industry R&D intensity is computed using the 48 industry 
groups as in Fama and French (1997). R&D expenditure to sales is R&D expenditure (Compustat data item # 46) divided by sales (Compustat data item # 
12). Sales growth is change in sales between year (t) and year-(t-1) divided by sales in year (t-1). Return on assets is operating income divided by total asset 
(Compustat data item # 6) where operating income is {sales(#12) - cost of goods sold (#41) - sales and general administrative expenses(#189) + R&D 
expense}. The industry market share for a firm is the firm’s sales divided by the total sales of the all firms in the same industry for that year.  
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TABLE 4: Stock Valuation of Leaders and Followers 
 
PANEL A: Annual excess returns when classification is based on R&D expenditure to sales  
 Leaders Followers Difference  
  
Excess 
returns t-stat 
Excess 
returns t-stat t-stat p-value 
One year after, year (t+1) 0.0178 3.17 0.0079 1.89 1.39 0.15 
Two  years after, year (t+2) 0.0759 9.32 0.0001 0.01 8.10 0.00 
Three  years after, year (t+3) 0.0400 5.75 0.0007 0.15 4.58 0.00 
Four  years after, year (t+4) 0.0278 3.88 0.0034 0.78 2.91 0.00 
Average over (t+1) to (t+4) 0.0404   0.0030       
 
PANEL B: Annual excess returns when classification is based on R&D expenditure to market value 
of equity 
 Leaders Followers Difference  
  
Excess 
returns t-stat 
Excess 
returns t-stat t-stat p-value 
One year after, year (t+1) 0.0447 6.27 -0.0027 -0.73 5.91 0.00 
Two  years after, year (t+2) 0.0877 8.79 0.0077 1.72 7.31 0.00 
Three  years after, year (t+3) 0.0324 4.15 0.0110 2.28 2.46 0.01 
Four  years after, year (t+4) 0.0380 4.30 0.0029 0.71 3.59 0.00 
Average over (t+1) to (t+4) 0.0507   0.0047      
 
Notes: 
1. The sample contains all domestic NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms covered in CRSP and COMPUSTAT with 
non-zero R&D expenditures, Sales greater than $10 million and total assets greater than $5 million for the 
period 1975 to 1997. 
2. In Panel A, firms are classified as Leaders in year (t) if the industry adjusted R&D expenditure to Sales is 
greater than zero; and Followers otherwise. The mean excess returns for each of the four subsequent years for 
the portfolio of firms classified as Leaders and Followers in year (t) is reported. The difference column shows t-
stat and p-value of t-stat for the difference in the annual excess returns of the Leaders minus the annual excess 
returns of the Followers (i.e., hedge portfolio returns). 
3. In Panel B, firms are classified as Leaders in year (t) if the industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to market value 
of equity is greater than zero; and Followers otherwise. The mean excess returns for each of the four subsequent 
years for the portfolio of firms classified as Leaders and Followers in year (t) is reported. The difference column 
shows t-stat and p-value of t-stat for the difference in the annual excess returns of the Leaders minus the annual 
excess returns of the Followers (i.e., hedge portfolio returns).  
 
Variable Definitions: 
A firm is classified as a Leader in year t, if the industry-adjusted R&D intensity is greater than zero, and as a 
Follower otherwise. R&D intensity of each firm in year t is measured as (a) R&D expenditures in year t to sales in 
year t, and (b) R&D expenditures in year t to market value of equity four months subsequent to the fiscal year-end of 
year t. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the difference between the firm’s R&D 
expenditure to sales and the industry’s R&D to sales for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to 
 44
sales is computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to sales with sales as value-weight. The industry-adjusted 
R&D expenditure to market value of equity is computed as the difference between the firm’s R&D expenditure to 
market value of equity minus the industry’s R&D to market value of equity for the corresponding year. The 
industry’s R&D expenditure to market value of equity is computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to 
market value of equity with market value of equity as value-weight. The industry R&D intensity is computed using 
the 48 industry groups as in Fama and French (1997). R&D expenditure to Sales is R&D expenditure (Compustat 
data item # 46) divided by sales revenue (Compustat data item # 12). R&D expenditure to market value of equity is 
R&D expenditure divided by market value of equity. Market value is calculated as share outstanding times price at 
the end of April. The excess returns is computed using the companion portfolio approach where the companion 
portfolio for each firm is determined based on the book-to-market ratio and the market value of equity (see CLS). 
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TABLE 5: Robustness test of Stock Valuation of R&D Leaders and Followers 
 
PANEL A: Annual excess returns when classification is based on R&D expenditure to sales  
 
Leaders in years (t-1) and 
(t) 
Followers in years (t-1) and 
(t) Difference 
  
Excess 
returns t-stat 
Excess 
returns t-stat t-stat p value 
One year after, year (t+1) 0.0202 3.42 0.0082 1.91 1.75 0.08 
Two  years after, year (t+2) 0.0747 9.34 -0.0024 -0.50 7.95 0.00 
Three  years after, year (t+3) 0.0423 5.64 -0.0019 -0.43 5.11 0.00 
Four  years after, year (t+4) 0.0316 4.08 0.0039 0.88 2.32 0.01 
Average over (t+1) to (t+4) 0.0422   0.0020       
 
PANEL B: Annual excess returns when classification is based on R&D expenditure to market value 
of equity 
 
Leaders in years (t-1) and 
(t) 
Followers in years (t-1) and 
(t) Difference 
  
Excess 
returns t-stat 
Excess 
returns 
Excess 
returns t-stat p value 
One year after, year (t+1) 0.0392 5.16 -0.0031 -0.79 3.99 0.00 
Two  years after, year (t+2) 0.0668 6.70 0.0073 1.58 6.75 0.00 
Three  years after, year (t+3) 0.0462 4.96 0.0047 1.02 4.75 0.00 
Four  years after, year (t+4) 0.0429 4.29 0.0030 0.71 4.11 0.00 
Average over (t+1) to (t+4) 0.0488   0.0030       
 
Notes: 
1. The sample contains all domestic NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms covered in CRSP and COMPUSTAT with 
non-zero R&D expenditures, sales greater than $10 million and total assets greater than $5 million for the 
period 1975 to 1997. 
2. In Panel A, firms are classified as Leaders in year (t) if the industry adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is 
greater than zero; and Followers otherwise. The mean excess returns for each of the four subsequent years for 
the portfolio of firms classified as Leaders and Followers in year (t) is reported. The difference column shows t-
stat and p-value of t-stat for the difference in the annual excess returns of the Leaders minus the annual excess 
returns of the Followers (i.e., hedge portfolio returns). 
3. In Panel B, firms are classified as Leaders in year (t) if the industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to market value 
of equity is greater than zero; and Followers otherwise. The mean excess returns for each of the four subsequent 
years for the portfolio of firms classified as Leaders and Followers in year (t) is reported. The difference column 
is the difference in the annual excess returns of the Leaders minus the annual excess returns of the Followers 
(i.e., hedge portfolio returns).  
 
Variable Definitions: 
A firm is classified as a Leader in year t, if the industry-adjusted R&D intensity is greater than zero, and as a 
Follower otherwise. R&D intensity of each firm in year t is measured as (a) R&D expenditures in year t to sales in 
year t, and (b) R&D expenditures in year t to market value of equity four months subsequent to the fiscal year-end of 
 46
year t. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the difference between the firm’s R&D 
expenditure to sales and the industry’s R&D to sales for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to 
sales is computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to sales with sales as value-weight. The industry-adjusted 
R&D expenditure to market value of equity is computed as the difference between the firm’s R&D expenditure to 
market value of equity minus the industry’s R&D to market value of equity for the corresponding year. The 
industry’s R&D expenditure to market value of equity is computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to 
market value of equity with market value of equity as value-weight. Market value is calculated as share outstanding 
times price at the end of April. The industry R&D intensity is computed using the 48 industry groups as in Fama and 
French (1997). R&D expenditure to sales is R&D expenditure (Compustat data item # 46) divided by sales revenue 
(Compustat data item # 12). R&D expenditure to market value of equity is R&D expenditure divided by market 
value of equity. The excess returns is computed using the companion portfolio approach where the companion 
portfolio for each firm is determined based on the book-to-market ratio and the market value of equity (see CLS). 
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Table 6: Stock Return Valuation of Leaders and Followers, Equation (1) 
  Portfolio b0 t-stat b1 t-stat b2 t-stat b3 t-stat b4 t-stat R2 
One year after, year (t+1) Followers 0.0022 2.89 0.9953 52.85 0.9095 32.67 0.0911 2.84 -0.0899 -4.00 0.95 
 Leaders 0.0033 2.98 1.0451 37.27 1.0400 25.09 -0.3014 -6.31 -0.1816 -5.43 0.93 
             
Two years after, year (t+2) Followers 0.0023 2.71 1.0265 49.42 0.7304 26.69 0.1682 4.70 -0.1528 -6.25 0.94 
 Leaders 0.0055 4.51 1.0110 34.41 0.9619 24.85 -0.2940 -5.80 -0.1453 -4.20 0.92 
             
Three years after, year (t+3) Followers 0.0027 3.30 1.0174 50.03 0.6753 25.74 0.1754 5.69 -0.1693 -8.80 0.94 
 Leaders 0.0061 5.40 1.0199 36.59 0.8668 24.10 -0.2441 -5.78 -0.2002 -7.59 0.93 
             
Four years after, year (t+4) Followers 0.0031 3.84 0.9907 50.51 0.5749 23.05 0.1616 5.51 -0.1434 -8.10 0.94 
  Leaders 0.0052 5.08 1.0150 40.31 0.7534 23.53 -0.1874 -4.97 -0.1736 -7.63 0.94 
 
1. Equation (1):    Rit – Rft   =  b0i  + b1i [ Rmt - Rft ]  + b2i SMBt  +  b3i  HMLt +  b4i  UMDt +eit . 
2. The sample contains all domestic NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms covered in CRSP and COMPUSTAT with non-zero R&D expenditures, sales greater 
than $10 million and total assets greater than $5 million for the period 1975 to 1997. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
A firm is classified as a Leader in year t, if the industry adjusted R&D intensity is greater than zero, and as a Follower otherwise. R&D intensity of each firm in 
year t is measured as R&D expenditures (data#46) in year t to sales (data#12) in year t. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the 
difference between the firm’s R&D expenditure to sales and the industry’s R&D to sales for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to sales is 
computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to sales with sales as value-weight. The industry R&D intensity is computed using the 48 industry groups as 
in Fama and French (1997). R&D expenditure to sales is R&D expenditure (Compustat data item # 46) divided by sales revenue (Compustat data item # 12). Rit 
is the monthly return of the portfolio for portfolio i in month t, Rft is the treasury bill rate in month t, Rmt is the value-weighted market index, SMBt and HMLt are 
the returns on the Fama and French (1993) factor-mimicking portfolios for size and book-to-market, respectively, UMDt is the momentum returns on a portfolio 
of past winners (top quintile) and past losers (bottom quintile) beginning seven months ago and ending one month ago. 
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TABLE 7: Future Stock Return Volatility of Leaders and Followers 
 
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
STDRET  -3.8139 0.3954 -4.8878 -4.1259 -3.8395 -3.5093 -2.5790 
RNDM 0.0562 0.0635 0.0001 0.0172 0.0367 0.0722 0.9574 
LEADER 0.4337 0.4956 nm nm nm nm nm 
AR 0.0205 0.4244 -1.2534 -0.2175 -0.0255 0.1820 5.7622 
VOL 1.2164 1.3238 0.0514 0.4611 0.7279 1.3879 12.5500 
LMV 6.8557 1.4943 2.6018 5.7569 6.7372 7.7910 12.1121 
LEV 0.1750 0.1313 0.0000 0.0597 0.1685 0.2639 0.5900 
DM 0.0177 0.0188 0.0000 0.0000 0.0143 0.0295 0.1147 
EP 0.0475 0.0720 -0.5080 0.0347 0.0577 0.0793 0.3216 
BM 0.5221 0.3005 0.0581 0.3096 0.4581 0.6687 2.3259 
SG 0.1584 0.2623 -0.3694 0.0213 0.1036 0.2214 2.3170 
GROWTH   0.1674 0.0771 0.4756 0.1142 0.1448 0.2009 0.5572 
STDGR 0.0407 0.0374 0.0000 0.0220 0.0326 0.0496 0.0941 
NUMEST 8.1463 4.8311 3.0000 4.3333 6.5833 10.6667 30.2500 
CHGR -0.0240 0.1451 -0.5910 -0.1006 -0.0241 0.0439 1.6207 
CHSTD -0.0069 0.0008 -0.0100 -0.0073 -0.0067 -0.0064 -0.0061 
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PANEL B: Estimating equation (2) 
  Equation (2) without RNDM Equation (2)  
  
Coefficient 
Estimate t-stat 
Coefficient 
Estimate t-stat 
Intercept -3.93 -90.92 -3.97 -92.36 
RNDM (β1)   0.7498 9.81 
LEADER RNDM (βL1)   -0.1032 -2.43 
AR (β2) 0.0021 0.27 -0.0022 -0.29 
VOL (β3)  0.0987 31.64 0.0938 30.05 
LMV ((β4) -0.0674 -17.52 -0.0651 -17.03 
LEV (β5) -0.0541 -1.94 -0.053 -1.92 
DM (β6) -6.1497 -24.48 -5.6417 -22.27 
EP (β7) -0.4059 -8.19 -0.2848 -5.6 
BM (β8) 0.1627 10.84 0.0999 6.24 
SG (β9) -0.0285 -1.69 -0.0264 -1.58 
GROWTH (β10)   0.0113 13.93 0.0119 14.75 
STDGR (β11) 0.0022 1.96 0.0021 1.9 
NUMEST (β12) 0.0048 4.57 0.0039 3.69 
CHGR (β13) -0.1572 -6.56 -0.1512 -6.37 
CHSTD (β14) -0.3982 -8.43 -0.4063 -8.69 
Adjusted R2 (%) 61.09% 61.87% 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Equation (2): STDRETt+1 =[Fixed year effects] + β1RNDMt + βL1LEADERt RNDMt + β2ARt + β3VOLSt + β4LMVt+ β5LEVt+ β6DMt 
+ β7EPt+ β8BMt+ β9SGt + β10GROWTHt  + β11STDGRt + β12NUMESTt + β13CHGRt + β14CHSTDt + error 
3. The sample contains all domestic NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms covered in CRSP and COMPUSTAT with non-zero R&D expenditures, sales greater 
than $10 million, total assets greater than $5 million and followed by at least two analysts for the period 1982 to 1997. 
4. The sample contains 5,536 observations spanning 1982 to 1997. 
5. DM, LEV, BM, GROWTH, STDGR, CHGR, and CHSTD are winsorized at 1% and 99% of the distribution. 
6. nm in Panel A indicates the statistics are not meaningful. 
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Variable Definitions: STDRET is the stock return volatility computed the log of standard deviation of daily stock returns measured over from May of year t+1 to 
April of year t+2 (see Bushee and Noe, 2000). RNDM is the R&D expenditure (data#46) to market value of equity in year t. LEADER is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one if the industry-adjusted R&D intensity computed based on R&D to sales of the firm is greater than zero in year t. A firm is classified as a 
Leader in year t, if the industry-adjusted R&D intensity is greater than zero, and as a Follower otherwise. R&D intensity of each firm in year t is measured as 
R&D expenditures (data#46) in year t to sales (data#12) in year t. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the difference between the 
firm’s R&D expenditure to sales and the industry’s R&D to sales for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the value-
weighted R&D expenditure to sales with sales as value-weight. AR is the size and book-to-market adjusted excess returns in year t corresponding to the 
STDRET. VOL is annual mean of monthly trading volume relative to shares outstanding at the end of each month. LMV is log of market value of equity where 
market value is computed as share outstanding times price at the end of April. LEV is leverage ratio computed as long term debt (data#9) plus current debt 
(data#34) divided by total asset is (data#6). EP is Earning-to-price ratio computed as income before extraordinary items (data#18) divided by market value of 
equity. BM is book-to-market ratio computed as book value of equity (data#60) divided by market value of equity. DM is dividend yield computed as dividend 
(data#21) divided by market value of equity. SG is sales growth measured as change in sales revenue (data#12) between year t and year (t-1) divided by sales 
revenue in year (t-1). GROWTH is the annual (from May to April) mean of analyst monthly consensus long-term growth forecast in year t obtained from IBES 
summary database. STDGR is the annual (from May to April) mean of monthly standard deviation of analyst long-term growth forecast obtained from IBES 
summary database. NUMEST is the annual (from May to April) mean of number of forecast in a month obtained from IBES summary database. CHGR and 
CHSTD are the change in GROWTH and STDGR from one year to the next scaled by previous year’s GROWTH and STDGR, respectively.  
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TABLE 8: Future Earnings Variability of Leaders and Followers 
 
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
EPS 0.0534 0.1676 -1.0000 0.0198 0.0672 0.1172 1.0000 
SD(EPSt+1, +5) 0.0417 0.0453 0.0014 0.0113 0.0333 0.0529 0.4596 
RNDM 0.0697 0.0769 0.0000 0.0201 0.0445 0.0902 0.6863 
CapEx 0.1146 0.1328 0.0000 0.0355 0.0728 0.1436 2.2293 
LMV -2.2439 1.9833 -8.1311 -3.7200 -2.4743 -0.9405 3.6855 
LEV 0.2605 0.2884 0.0000 0.0437 0.1796 0.3826 3.1493 
  
PANEL B: Estimating equation (3) 
  Equation (3) without interaction Equation (3) 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Estimate  t-stat 
Coefficient 
Estimate  t-stat 
RNDM (β1t) 0.0760 7.50 0.1186 11.44 
LEADERS RNDM (βL1t)   -0.0321 -2.29 
CapEx (β2t) 0.0169 3.66 0.0166 3.20 
LEADERS CapEx (βL2t)   -0.0171 -2.67 
LMV (β3t) -0.0081 -25.47 -0.0083 -25.18 
LEV (β4t) 0.0225 13.28 0.0209 12.61 
 
Notes: 
1. Equation (3) : SD(Et+1,t+5)=[Industry Fixed Effects]+ β1t RNDMt +βL2t LEADERt RNDMt + β2t CapExt +βL1tLEADERt CapExt +β3tLMVt+β4tLEVt+errort+1,t+5   
2. The sample contains all domestic NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms covered in CRSP and COMPUSTAT with non-zero R&D expenditures, sales greater 
than $10 million and total assets greater than $5 million for the period 1975 to 1997. 
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3. The sample contains 27,458 firm-year observations spanning 1975 to 1997. 
4. The coefficient estimates in Panel B are the mean of the annual coefficient estimates of equation (3). 
5. The t-statistics in Panel B are the t-statistics of the annual coefficient estimates of equation (3). 
6. All variables except EPS are winsorized at 1% and 99% of the annual distributions. EPS values greater than +1 or less than -1 are winsorized at +1 and -1. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
A firm is classified as a Leader in year t, if the industry-adjusted R&D intensity is greater than zero, and as a Follower otherwise. R&D intensity of each firm in 
year t is measured as R&D expenditures in year t to sales in year t. The industry-adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the difference between the 
firm’s R&D expenditure to sales and the industry’s R&D to sales for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the value-
weighted R&D expenditure to sales with sales as value-weight. The industry R&D intensity is computed using the 48 industry groups as in Fama and French 
(1997). R&D expenditure to sales is R&D expenditure (data#46) divided by sales revenue (data#12). RNDM is R&D expenditure (data#46) divided by market 
value of equity. Market value of equity is price (data #199) times shares outstanding (data #54). CapEx is capital expenditures per share (data #128) deflated by 
number of shares outstanding (data #54). LMV is the natural log of market value of equity at the end of fiscal year. LEV is the sum of long-term debt, (data#9) 
and debt in current liabilities, (data #34), divided by sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. EPS is earnings per share before extraordinary times and 
discontinued operations (data#58). STD is standard deviation of earnings per share. STD is calculated using five annual earnings observations for years t+1 
through t+5. When EPS data are missing in any of the years from t+1 through t+5 STD is set equal to mean STD of the firms in the same Altman Z-Score decile 
portfolio.  
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TABLE 9: Role of Financial Analysts for Leaders and Followers 
 
PANEL A: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Median 
   Difference   Difference 
 Leaders Followers t-stat p-value Leaders Followers z-stat p-value 
NUMEST 8.11 7.91 1.67 0.09 6.58 6.42 0.60 0.54 
GROWTH    0.1941 0.1451 25.43 0.00 0.1748 0.1314 24.60 0.00 
STDGR  0.0456 0.0362 9.74 0.00 0.0383 0.0286 16.92 0.00 
RNDM  0.0811 0.0297 19.65 0.00 0.0645 0.0191 11.55 0.00 
CHGR  -0.0332 -0.0161 4.52 0.00 -0.0329 0.0159 -5.18 0.00 
CHSTD  -0.0069 -0.0070 1.37 0.17 -0.0067 -0.0067 0.61 0.57 
 
PANEL B: The Excess returns for firms with three or more analysts 
 Leaders Followers Difference 
  
Excess 
returns t-stat 
Abnormal   
Returns t-stat t-stat p-value 
One year after, year (t+1) 0.0408 4.35 0.0072 1.14 2.51 0.01 
Two years after, year (t+2) 0.1083 6.51 -0.0050 -0.72 5.77 0.00 
Three years after, year (t+3) 0.0609 4.14 0.0007 0.11 3.18 0.00 
Four years after, year (t+4) 0.0417 3.10 0.0134 1.96 1.78 0.08 
Average over (t+1) to (t+4) 0.0629   0.0041     
 
PANEL C: The Excess returns for firm with less than three analysts 
 Leaders Followers Difference 
  
Excess 
returns t-stat 
Excess 
returns t-stat t-stat p-value 
One year after, year (t+1) 0.0109 0.89 0.0081 0.79 0.01 0.96 
Two years after, year (t+2) 0.0663 3.88 0.0013 0.11 5.64 0.00 
Three years after, year (t+3) 0.0338 2.34 0.0008 0.06 2.54 0.01 
Four years after, year (t+4) 0.0236 1.54 0.0011 0.10 2.32 0.02 
Average over (t+1) to (t+4) 0.0337   0.0028     
 
Notes: 
1 The sample contains all domestic NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq firms covered in CRSP, IBES and COMPUSTAT 
with non-zero R&D expenditures, sales greater than $10 million and total assets greater than $5 million for the 
period 1982 to 1997. 
2 The mean excess returns for each of the four subsequent years for the portfolio of firms classified as Leaders and 
Followers in year (t) is reported. The difference column in Panel B and Panel C is the difference in the annual 
excess returns of the Leaders minus the annual excess returns of the Followers (i.e., hedge portfolio returns). 
3 GROWTH, STDGR, CHGR, and CHSTD are winsorized at the top and bottom one percent. 
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4 The difference columns in Panel A show the p-value of difference between Leaders and Followers. 
 
Variable Definitions: 
A firm is classified as a Leader in year t, if the industry adjusted R&D intensity is greater than zero, and as a Follower 
otherwise. R&D intensity of each firm in year t is measured as R&D expenditures in year t to Sales in year t. The 
industry adjusted R&D expenditure to sales is computed as the difference between the firm’s R&D expenditure to 
sales and the industry’s R&D to sales for the corresponding year. The industry’s R&D expenditure to sales is 
computed as the value-weighted R&D expenditure to sales with sales as value-weight. The industry R&D intensity is 
computed using the 48 industry groups as in Fama and French (1997). R&D expenditure to Sales is R&D expenditure 
(Campustat data item # 46) divided by sales revenue (Campustat data item # 12). market value of equity is calculated 
as share outstanding times price at the end of April. R&D expenditure to market value of equity is R&D expenditure 
divided by market value of equity. GROWTH is the annual mean of analyst monthly consensus long term growth 
forecast in year t. (from May to April). STDGR is the annual mean of monthly standard deviation of analyst long term 
growth forecast. NUMEST is the annual mean of number of forecast in a month. CHGR is the change in GROWTH in 
a given year scaled by lagged GROWTH. CHSTD is the change in STDGR scaled by lagged STDGR. RNDM is 
R&D to market value is R&D expenditure divided by market value of equity. The excess returns is computed using 
the companion portfolio approach where the companion portfolio for each firm is determined based on the book-to-
market ratio and the market value of equity (see CLS). 
 
